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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

JAYNE I. PATIENCE,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 960399-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from the trial court's judgment of
conviction entered on December 8, 1995.
is in Addendum A.

A copy of the Judgment

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW
AND PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE I.

Did plain error or ineffective assistance of

counsel occur where the trial judge failed to sentence Appellant
pursuant to the reduced penalty in effect at the time of her
sentencing and, instead, sentenced Appellant to the greater
penalty which was in effect for this crime at the time the
Information was filed?
STANDARD OF REVIEW.
law.

State v. Yates, 918 P.2d 136, 138 (Utah App. 1996).
PRESERVATION.

court.

This issue involves a question of

This issue was not raised in the trial

This Court can review this issue under a plain error or

ineffective assistance of counsel analysis.

See State v. Dunn,

850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993); State v. Arauelles. 921 P.2d
439, 440-41 (Utah 1996).

Additionally, Pursuant to Rule 22(e),

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court can review this
illegal sentence.

State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 859-60 (Utah

1995) .
ISSUE II.

Did the trial court commit reversible error in

imposing consecutive sentences based on its determination that
Appellant had committed an additional embezzlement where the
other matter involved a civil dispute and was never charged
criminally?
STANDARD OF REVIEW.

This issue involves a question of

law which is reviewed for correctness.

See State v. Pena, 869

P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
PRESERVATION.

Defense counsel informed the judge that

the otfrer dispute was resolved civilly.

R. 105.

Additionally,

this i^sue is reviewable under a plain error analysis.

See Dunn,

850 P.2d at 1208.
ISSUE III.

Did plain error and ineffective assistance of

counsel occur where Patience was convicted of three counts of
Attempted Forgery instead of one count based on a series of
transactions which were part of one plan and based on one general
intent to embezzle?
STANDARD OF REVIEW.
law.

This issue involves a question of

See Pena. 869 P.2d at 936.
PRESERVATION.

This issue was not raised in the trial

court £>ut is reviewable under a plain error or ineffective
assistance of counsel analysis.

See DuOS/ 850 P.2d at 1208;

State v. Crosby, 302 Utah Adv. Rep. 36, 41 (Utah 1996) .
2

TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The text of the following statutes and constitutional
provisions is in Addendum B:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1995);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-102 (1995);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1995);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (Supp. 1996);
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution;
Article I, Section 7, Utah Constitution.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On March 20, 1996, the State filed an Information
charging Defendant/Appellant Jayne I. Patience ("Appellant" or
"Patience") with three counts of Forgery, a second degree felony.
R. 5-7.

On October 20, 1995, Patience pled guilty to three

counts of Attempted Forgery, a third degree felony.
28-29, 31-37.

R. 5-7,

Copies of the plea Affidavit and Amended

Information are in Addendum C.

On December 8, 1995, the trial

court sentenced Patience to serve three zero-to-five-year
sentences consecutively at the Utah State Prison.

R. 3 9-41.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On May 5, 1995, a change in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501
took effect.

Pursuant to that change, the penalty for a forgery

involving a check with a face amount of $100 or more decreased
from a second to a third degree felony.

Compare Utah Code Ann.

§ 76-6-501 (1995) with Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (Supp. 1996) .
Despite the change, the trial judge in this case sentenced
Patience based on the penalty in effect at the time she was
charged rather than the lesser penalty which was in effect at the
3

time Patience was sentenced.

R. 39-41.

At the sentencing hearing held on December 8, 1995,
Patience's former employer, Virginius Dabney, appeared and spoke
strongly in favor of incarceration.

R. 102-105.

The transcript

of Dabney's sentencing statement is in Addendum D.

Dabney was

not placed under oath and he was not cross-examined.
Dabney claimed that Patience had embezzled $18,000 from
him when she worked for him as a legal secretary.

R. 104.

Dabney also discussed Patience's prior misdemeanor conviction,
claiming that Patience had embezzled from a prior employer and,
even though Dabney had helped her at sentencing, Patience had
then embezzled from him.

R. 104-05.

Dabney stated in part:
. . . within two or three months after I went to
that extent [spoke on Patience's behalf at
sentencing], Jane started to embezzle from me.
She embezzled $18,000 in a period of ten months.

She has worked for three different employers.
She has embezzled from all of us.
R. 104-05.
Defense counsel argued that the dispute between Dabney
and Patience was resolved civilly.

R. 105. He stated:

Mr. Dabney has made an impassioned plea, but
I would simply remind the court this entire
dispute with Miss Patience was resolved as a
civil dispute. He sued her. He obtained a
judgment against her. He settled with her for an
amount less than the judgment, and called that a
satisfaction, and he received less than what he
obtained in the judgment, but he did accept it as
payment in full, and it was a civil matter, and
not a criminal matter.
4

R. 105. Nevertheless, the judge relied on the civil dispute
between Patience and Dabney as the reason for imposing
consecutive sentences.
The victims have been stacked up back to
back. It is unlikely that more than a few days
lapsed from victim A to victim B to victim C.
And the Court is of the opinion that the theft
was continuous, it was on-going, and but for the
fact that the defendant was caught on this case,
three more employers would have resulted in three
more victims.
R. 107.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial judge erred in sentencing Patience to serve
three consecutive zero-to-five-year sentences for three counts of
Attempted Forgery.

Attempted Forgery was a class A misdemeanor,

not a third degree felony, at the time of Patience's sentencing.
Pursuant to established case law which has been in effect in Utah
for twenty-five years and was recently followed by this Court in
State v. Yates. 918 P.2d 136 (Utah App. 1996), Appellant was
entitled to the benefit of the lesser penalty where such penalty
was in effect at the time of her sentencing.

The imposition of

the incorrect sentence was plain error since it was obvious under
existing law and prejudiced Patience by sentencing her too
severely.

The sentence was illegal and can be reviewed by this

Court on appeal pursuant to Rule 22 (e), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

See State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d at 859-60.

Additionally, Patience received ineffective assistance of counsel
where her attorney failed to argue that imposition of class A
misdemeanor sentences was required.
5

The trial judge erred in imposing consecutive sentences
based on his determination that Patience had committed three
continuous crimes of embezzlement.

Statements by Patience's

former employer during sentencing which were not under oath or
subject to cross-examination and which were related to a civil
dispute the employer had with Patience did not establish that
Patience had committed the crime of embezzlement against that
employer.
Utah case law requires that a defendant be convicted of
only one count where "the evidence discloses one general intent"
and "one plan, even though there is a series of transactions."
State v. Kimbel, 620 P.2d 515, 518 (Utah 1980); State v. Crosby,
3 02 Utah Adv. Rep. at 38.

In this case, the evidence disclosed

one general intent and plan.

Indeed, the prosecutor, defense

counsel, victim, and judge all considered this an ongoing crime.
The error was obvious under case law in effect at the time
Patience was charged.

Defense counsel performed deficiently in

failing to bring this issue to the court's attention.

The error

was harmful in that Patience was convicted of three counts rather
than one.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. REVERSIBLE ERROR OCCURRED WHERE THE
TRIAL COURT FAILED TO SENTENCE PATIENCE PURSUANT
TO THE LESSER PENALTY IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF
HER SENTENCING.

6

A. ATTEMPTED FORGERY WAS A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR
AT THE TIME PATIENCE WAS SENTENCED; PATIENCE IS
ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT OF THIS LESSER PENALTY.
The Utah Legislature amended Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501
effective May 1, 1995.

The amendment changed the classification

for a forgery involving a check with a face amount of $100 or
more from a second to a third degree felony.

Compare Utah Code

Ann. § 76-6-501 (1995) with Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (Supp.
1996).

The version of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (Supp. 1996)

which went into effect on May 1, 1995 states:
76-6-501. Forgery--"Writing" defined.
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with
purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge that
he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by
anyone, he:
(a) alters any writing of another
without his authority or utters any
such altered writing; or
(b) makes, completes, executes,
authenticates, issues, transfers,
publishes, or utters any writing so
that the writing or the making,
completion, execution, authentication,
issuance, transference, publication or
utterance purports to be the act of
another, whether the person is existent
or nonexistent, or purports to have
been executed at a time or place or in
a numbered sequence other than was in
fact the case, or to be a copy of an
original when no such original existed.
(2) As used in this section, "writing"
includes printing, electronic storage or
transmission, or any other method of recording
valuable information including forms such as:
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals,
credit cards, badges, trademarks,
money, and any other symbols of value,
right, privilege, or identification;
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or
any other instrument or writing issued
by a government or any agency; or
(c) a check, an issue of stocks,
bonds, or any other instruments or

7

writing representing an interest in or
claim against property, or a pecuniary
interest in or claim against any person
or enterprise.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third
degree.
The previous version of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1995)
which was in effect when Patience was charged states in relevant
part:
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second
degree if the writing is or purports to be:
(b) a check with a face amount of
$100 or more, an issue of stocks,
bonds, or any other instrument or
writing representing an interest in or
claim against property, or a pecuniary
interest in or claim against any person
or enterprise.
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third degree
if the writing is or purports to be a check with
a face amount of less than $100; all other
forgery is a class A misdemeanor.
Patience pled guilty to three counts of attempting to
alter the check of another with a face value of $100 or more.
R. 31-33.

At the time Patience entered her plea as well as at

the time of sentencing, forgery was a third degree felony,
regardless of the face value of the check.
§ 76-6-501 (Supp. 1996).

See Utah Code Ann.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-

102(4) (1995), an attempt to commit a third degree felony is a
class A misdemeanor.

Therefore, at the time Patience was

sentenced, Attempted Forgery was a class A misdemeanor.
Case law in effect in Utah at the time Patience was
sentenced mandated that the trial judge sentence her for the
lesser class A misdemeanor which applied to her crime at the time

8

of sentencing.

S^e Belt v. Turner, 479 P.2d 791 (Utah 1971);

State v. Tapp, 490 P.2d 334 (Utah 1971); Shelmidine v. Jones, 550
P.2d 207, 211 (Utah 1976); State v. Saxton, 519 P.2d 1340, 1342
(Utah 1974); see also Yates, 918 P.2d at 138.
The Belt Court relied on the rationale in People v.
Oliver, 134 N.E.2d 197 (N.Y. 1956):
This application of statutes reducing punishment
accords with the best modern theories concerning
the functions of punishment in criminal law.
According to these theories, the punishment or
treatment of criminal offenders is directed
toward one or more of three ends:
(1) to
discourage and act as a deterrent upon future
criminal activity, (2) to confine the offender so
that he may not harm society and (3) to correct
and rehabilitate the offender. There is no place
in the scheme for punishment for its own sake,
the product simply of vengeance or retribution,
[citations omitted]. A legislative mitigation of
the penalty for a particular crime represents a
legislative judgment that the lesser penalty or
the different treatment is sufficient to meet the
legitimate ends of the criminal law. Nothing is
to be gained by imposing the more severe penalty
after such a pronouncement; the excess in
punishment can, by hypothesis, serve no purpose
other than to satisfy a desire for vengeance. As
to a mitigation of penalties, then, it is safe to
assume, as the modern rule does, that it was the
legislative design that the lighter penalty
should be imposed in all cases that subsequently
reach the courts.
Belt, 479 P.2d at 793 (quoting Oliver, 134 N.Ed.2d at 201-02).
In cases where an amendment reducing the criminal penalty
becomes effective prior to sentencing, the Supreme Court has
"consistently held that in such situations, xthe law in force at
the time of sentencing govern[s] . . . .'"

Smith v. Cook, 803

P.2d 788, 792 (Utah 1990) (quoting Harris v. Smith, 541 P.2d 343,
344 (Utah 1975)) (emphasis in original).
9

See also Saxton, 519

P.2d at 1342 (defendant is entitled to lesser punishment if
penalty for offense is reduced before imposition of sentence).
The rationale for this rule was set forth in Tapp, 4 90
P.2d at 336:
[I]t is the prerogative of the legislature,
expressing the will of the people, to fix the
penalties for crimes and the courts should give
effect to the enactment and the effective date
thereof as so declared . . . [T]o insist on the
prior existing harsher penalty is a refusal to
accept and keep abreast of the process which has
been continuing over the years of ameliorating
and modifying the treatment of antisocial
behavior by changing the emphasis from vengeance
and punishment to treatment and rehabilitation.
In the same tenor are the time-honored rules of
the criminal law generally favorable to one
accused of a crime: that in case of doubt or
uncertainty as to the degree of crime, he is
entitled to the lesser; and correlated thereto:
that as to an alternative between a severe or a
lenient punishment, he is entitled to the latter.
Tapp, 490 P.2d at 336.
In Yates, 918 P.2d at 138-139, this Court recently
applied the rule that "defendants are entitled to the benefit of
the lesser penalty afforded by an amended statute made effective
prior to their sentencing."

Yates, 918 P.2d at 13 8.

This Court

acknowledged that "[t]he Utah Supreme Court articulated this
principle twenty-five years ago," and additionally, that Utah
Code Ann. § 76-1-103(2) (1995) suggests that a defendant is
entitled to the lesser penalty in effect at the time of
sentencing.

In Yates, this Court held that Yates was entitled to

the benefit of the change in penalty for theft crimes which went

10

into effect May 1, 1995.x
The State argued that Yates should not benefit from the
Belt rule because:

(1) the actual value of the property stolen

rather than the amount to which Yates pled guilty should control
the classification of the crime, and (2) Yates was responsible
for the delay in sentencing.

Yates, 918 P.2d at 13 9-140.

This

Court rejected both arguments, determining (1) the "facts" listed
in the amended charging documents control the nature of the
conviction, and (2) the Belt rule requires that a defendant be
sentenced pursuant to the lesser penalty in effect at the time of
sentencing regardless of whether a "defendant's misconduct delays
Id.2

sentencing beyond the amended statute's effective date."
In the present case, the Amended Information, plea

affidavit and Judgment all indicate that Patience pled guilty to
and was convicted of three counts of Attempted Forgery.

R. 5-6,

31-5, 3 9-41; see Addendum D; see also Yates, 918 P.2d at 13 9. At
the time of Patience's sentencing on December 8, 1995, Forgery
was a third degree felony.
1996); see Addendum A.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (Supp.

An attempt to commit a third degree

felony was a class A misdemeanor.
(1995).

Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-102

Attempted Forgery, therefore, was a class A misdemeanor

1

The statutory change at issue in Yates was made as part of
the same legislative package as the statutory changes at issue in
Yates. See discussion of legislative history regarding decision to
lower classification for these offenses in Yates, 918 P.2d at 139.
2

Neither of the infirmities claimed by the State and
rejected by this Court in Yates exist in this case. Patience did
not cause a delay in sentencing, and Forgery is a third degree
felony regardless of the amount involved.
11

when Patience was sentenced.

The trial judge erred in sentencing

Patience to three third degree felonies based on her convictions
for Attempted Forgery.
B. FAILURE TO SENTENCE PATIENCE FOR CLASS A
MISDEMEANORS CONSTITUTED AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE,
PLAIN ERROR AND INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL.
Defense counsel did not object to the imposition of the
illegal third degree felony sentences.

This error nevertheless

requires reversal under each of the following analyses:
(1) plain error, (2) the court's ability to correct an illegal
sentence, and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel.
"In order to demonstrate plain error, defendant must show
(1) error, (2) that the error should have been obvious to the
trial court, and (3) that the error was harmful."

State v.

Vigil, 922 P.2d 15, 29 (Utah 1996) (citing Dunn, 850 P.2d at
1208; State v. Tennev, 913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah App. 1996).
As set forth supra at 7-12, error occurred in this case
where the trial judge sentenced Patience for three third degree
felonies where Attempted Forgery was a class A misdemeanor at the
time of Patience's sentencing.

See Yates, 918 P.2d at 138.

This

error should have been obvious to the trial judge since the
statutory penalty had been amended and the principle that
defendants be given the benefit of the amended lesser penalty was
announced by the Supreme Court twenty-five years ago in Belt v.
Turner, 479 P.2d at 792-93, and has been repeatedly followed.
Yates, 918 P.2d at 138.

Indeed, as this Court stated in Yates:
12

Utah law on this question is clear and the
instant case does not present an exception to the
well-established rule: Defendants are entitled
to lesser criminal punishments mandated by
statutes that become effective before the court
imposes sentence. See Belt, 479 P.2d at 792-93.
After the legislature reduces criminal penalties,
courts must impose sentences accordingly.
Yates, 918 P.2d at 13 9 (emphasis added).

The error was

prejudicial in that Patience was sentenced to prison to serve
consecutively three sentences of zero to five years instead of
being sentenced to serve three maximum one-year sentences.
In addition to being plain error, this sentence is
illegal and can be reviewed by this Court pursuant to Rule 22(e),
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
859-60.

See Brooks, 908 P.2d at

Since Patience is attacking the sentence itself, this

Court may review this issue for the first time on appeal pursuant
to Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Id.; State v.

Babbel, 813 P.2d 86 (Utah 1991).
Finally, this issue can also be reviewed under a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing.

The Sixth

Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment, provides an accused the right to effective assistance
of counsel.

Arcruelles, 921 P.2d at 440.

"To prevail [on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel], a defendant must show,
first, that his counsel rendered a deficient
performance in some demonstrable manner, which
performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment and, second,
that counsel's performance prejudiced the
defendant."
Arcruelles, 921 P.2d at 441 (quoting Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d
13

516, 521 (Utah), cert, denied,

U.S.

, 11 S. Ct. 431, 130

L.Ed.2d 344 (1994) (quoting Bundv v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803, 805
(Utah 1988))) ; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984) .
Patience received ineffective assistance of counsel in
this case where (1) counsel performed deficiently by failing to
argue that Patience should have been sentenced for three class A
misdemeanors rather than three third degree felonies, and
(2) Patience was prejudiced by the deficient performance in that
she was sentenced more harshly than was permissible.

As set

forth supra at 7-12, the principle that a defendant is to be
sentenced pursuant to a lesser penalty which is in effect at the
time of sentencing was articulated by the Utah Supreme Court
twenty-five years ago and followed in subsequent decisions.

See

Belt, 479 P.2d at 792-93; see also Yates, 918 P.2d at 138.
Although "Utah law on this

question

[was]

clear,"

counsel

defense

failed to argue that Patience should receive the benefit of the
lesser penalty in effect at the time of her sentencing.
Yates, 918 P.2d at 139.

See

By failing to argue existing case law

and statutory provisions which would benefit Patience, counsel's
performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment."

State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah

1990) .
This Court will review claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel which are raised for the first time on appeal only
where the record is sufficient to allow the appellate court to
14

review the issue without remand of findings by the trial court.
See State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991); State v.
Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah App. 1993).

No evidence or

argument exists which would justify not arguing that Patience be
sentenced to the lesser penalty.
1029.

See Humphries, 818 P.2d at

"No sound course of trial strategy could dictate defense

counsel to be silent at such a critical time."
P.2d at 103 0.

Humphries, 818

Counsel's deficient performance prejudiced

Patience since she was improperly sentenced to prison to serve
three zero-to-five-year sentences rather than being correctly
sentenced to serve three one-year sentences.
POINT II. APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND A
FAIR SENTENCING HEARING WAS VIOLATED WHERE THE
TRIAL JUDGE BASED HIS DECISION TO IMPOSE
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES ON A CIVIL DISPUTE BETWEEN
APPELLANT AND A FORMER EMPLOYER.
Due process under the state and federal constitutions
applies to sentencing and "requires that a sentencing judge act
on reasonably reliable and relevant information in exercising
discretion in fixing a sentence."

State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d

1064, 1071 (Utah 1993), citing inter alia State v. Howell, 707
P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985).

Various other cases recognize the

need for accurate and reliable information in sentencing.

See,

e.g., State v. Lipskv, 608 P.2d 1241, 1248 (Utah 1980)
("Lipskv I"); Howell, 707 P.2d at 118; Townsend v. Burke. 334
U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 92 L.Ed.2d 1690 (1948).
In Townsend v. Burke, the United States Supreme Court
held that the defendant's right to due process was violated where
15

the sentencing judge relied on three charges which had been
dismissed or for which the defendant had been found not guilty.
The court reasoned that had the defendant been represented by
counsel, counsel would have informed the court that the three
charges did not result in convictions.

Accordingly,

it is the careless or designed pronouncement of
sentence on a foundation so extensively and
materially false, which the prison had no
opportunity to correct by services which counsel
would provide, that renders the proceedings
lacking in due process.
Id. at 1255.
The Utah Supreme Court emphasized in State v. Johnson,
856 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1993), that sentencing must be based on
reliable information in order to meet due process guarantees.
Johnson claimed that his right to due process was violated where
the trial court admitted "unproven allegations that there was
another victim" and placed the burden on him to refute the
allegations which were based on double and triple hearsay.

In

holding that the defendant's right to due process was violated at
sentencing, the Court reasoned that "a sentence cannot be
predicated on false information" or on information with little
probable accuracy.
In Howell, the Utah Supreme Court held that due process
rights of the defendants were not violated where the trial judge
considered evidence that the defendants' "children had been
[sexually] abused if not by [the defendants], then by someone
else" in determining sentence based on convictions for reckless
physical abuse of the children.

Howell, 707 P.2d at 118. The
16

Supreme Court reasoned that the damage caused by the sexual abuse
was visible and the parents "should have been aware of these
circumstances had they been acting with reasonable care toward
their children."

Id.

It reasoned further that the parents

"either knew of the sexual abuse . . . or were 'putting their
heads in the sand' to avoid finding out about it," and that
"[e]ither of these alternatives constitutes a form of physical
and sexual abuse."

Id. at 118. Accordingly, the Court held that

the defendants' right to due process was not violated at
sentencing.
The Howell court emphasized, however, that
The due process clause of Article I,
the Utah constitution, requires that
judge act on reasonably reliable and
information in exercising discretion
sentence.

section 7 of
a sentencing
relevant
in fixing a

Howell, 707 P.2d at 118.
State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1260 (Utah 1988),
discussed the use of unproven crimes in the penalty phase of a
capital homicide trial.

The court held that "the sentencing

body--be it judge or jury--may not rely on other violent criminal
activity unless it is first convinced beyond a reasonable doubt
that the accused did commit the other crime."
at 1260.

Lafferty, 749 P.2d

Reliance on unproven conduct could violate due process

and result in prejudice to a defendant where a sentencer imposes
death even though the conduct has not been proved.
concerns apply in the noncapital context.

Similar

A defendant who is

punished based on unproven conduct suffers unfair prejudice and a
17

violation of due process.

See State v. Womack, 319 N.W.2d 17, 19

(Minn. 1982) (error for trial judge to rely on charge which was
dismissed as part of plea bargain); People v. Harvey, 159 Cal.
Rptr. 696 (Cal. 1979); People v. Griffin, 166 N.E.2d 684 (N.Y.
1960) .
Although Utah case law has not directly addressed the
issue of whether a defendant's right to due process is violated
where the sentencing judge considers a civil judgment as evidence
of criminal activity and relies on that conduct as a basis for
sentencing, in the noncapital context, the lack of reliability of
the evidence presented in this case, as well as the lack of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that Patience committed the crime of
embezzlement against Dabney, demonstrates that Patience's right
to due process was violated in this case where the judge relied
on Dabney's statement as a basis for determining that Patience
perpetrated a third embezzlement.3
3

In State v. Harris, 861 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 1993)
(withdrawn from publication), Appellant claimed that his right to
due process was violated where the trial judge sentenced him based
on allegations which were not included in his guilty plea. The
State originally confessed error in that case, conceding that "in
sentencing defendant, the trial court erred in considering the
unproven charges which had been dismissed as the result of
defendant's plea bargain with the State." Appellee's brief in Case
No. 930034-CA at 3. This Court issued an opinion for publication
in which it held that the trial court had abused its discretion in
sentencing Appellant based on the dismissed charges. Thereafter,
the State petitioned for rehearing, claiming that it had improperly
confessed error and that controlling case law allowed the trial
court to consider the dismissed charges. This Court withdrew its
decision in Harris from publication but let the decision itself
stand.
Hence, this Court has previously determined in an
unpublished opinion that a trial court abused its discretion by
relying on an incident which did not result in a conviction as a
basis for sentencing.
18

Dabney made his statement without first being placed
under oath.

R. 102.

Defense counsel was not given the

opportunity to cross-examine Dabney.

R. 105.

Dabney indicated

that Patience had embezzled $18,000 from him and argued for
incarceration, claiming that she embezzled from three employers.
R. 103-105.

The trial judge was swayed by Dabney's statement and

argument, concluding that consecutive sentences at the prison
were appropriate because Patience had embezzled from three
employers.

R. 106-07.

Indeed, the trial judge speculated that

"it is unlikely that more than a few days lapsed from victim A to
victim B to victim C" and considered the theft continuous and
ongoing.

R. 106-07.4

4

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 discusses the impositions of
concurrent or consecutive sentences. It states in pertinent part:
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences-Limitations.
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant
has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony
offense,
whether
ii
impose
concurrent
or
consecutive sentences for the offenses. Sentences
for state offenses shall run concurrently unless
the court states in the sentence that they shall
run consecutively.
(2) A court shall consider the gravity and
circumstances of the offenses and the history,
character, and
rehabilitative
needs of
the
defendant
in determining whether
to
impose
consecutive sentences.
(3) A court may impose consecutive sentences
for offenses arising out of a single criminal
episode as defined in Section 76-1-401.
Effective May 1, 1995, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 was
amended to create a presumption for consecutive sentences where the
defendant was imprisoned or on parole when s/he committed the
crime. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (Supp. 1996). Patience was
not imprisoned or on parole when this crime was committed, so
concurrent sentences were favored regardless of which version of
§ 76-3-401 controls in this case.
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Under these circumstances where the trial judge relied on
a statement by a witness not under oath or subject to crossexamination regarding a civil matter as the basis for concluding
that Patience had committed an additional crime and sentenced
Patience based on that civil matter, Patience's right to due
process was violated.

The trial judge abused his discretion in

relying on Dabney's civil claims as the basis for imposing
consecutive sentences.
POINT III. PLAIN ERROR AND INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL OCCURRED IN THIS CASE WHERE
APPELLANT WAS CONVICTED OF THREE COUNTS OF
ATTEMPTED FORGERY INSTEAD OF ONE COUNT.
Plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel also
occurred in this case where Patience was convicted of three
counts of Attempted Forgery based on forgeries of three checks
which occurred as part of "an embezzlement over a period of
time."

State v. Kimbel, 620 P.2d 515, 518 (Utah 1980).

In

Kimbel, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
. . . [T]he general test as to whether there are
separate offenses or one offense is whether the
evidence discloses one general intent or
discloses separate and distinct intents. The
particular facts and circumstances of each case
determine this question. If there is but one
intention, one general impulse, and one plan,
even though there is a series of transactions,
there is but one offense . . . .
Id. at 518 (quoting People v. Howes, 222 P.2d 969 (Cal. Ct. App.
1950)).

The Kimbel court stated:

"This Court has held that

embezzlements over a period of time may be found to constitute
one continuous transaction."

Kimbel. 620 P.2d at 518.
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The Utah Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this principle
in Crosby, 3 02 Utah Adv. Rep. at 38.

In Crosby, the State

charged three counts of theft, alleging that "between November of
1991 and June of 1992, Crosby misappropriated company funds for
her personal use."

Id. at 36.

Crosby argued on appeal that

plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel occurred where
she was convicted of three counts of theft rather than one count.
Id. at 40. The Court pointed out that "[t]he evidence in this
case demonstrates that although the transactions underlying
Crosby's theft convictions occurred over a period of time, they
were part of a single plan and should have been charged as a
single offense."

Id.

Although the various transactions in

Crosby "were separated into different counts to distinguish the
different methods Crosby used to allegedly avert cash for her
personal use," the jury instructions "made no distinction between
the three counts."

Relying on Kimbel and State v. Patterson, 700

P.2d 1104 (Utah 1985), and the facts of the case, the Court held
that plain error occurred in sentencing Crosby to more than one
count of second degree felony theft.
Additionally, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-4 02 provides:
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a
single criminal action for all separate offenses
arising out of a single criminal episode;
however, when the same act of a defendant under a
single criminal episode shall establish offenses
which may be punished in different ways under
different provisions of this code, the act shall
be punishable under only one such provision; an
acquittal or conviction and sentence under any
such provision bars a prosecution under any other
such provision.
21

"Section 76-1-402 supports [the holding in Crosby]" (Crosby, 302
Utah Adv. Rep. 40) as well as Patience's position.
Although the State charged this crime as three counts of
Forgery rather than Theft, both the State and defense referred to
the crime as an ongoing embezzlement from Patience's employer.
R. 94, 96.

The prosecutor stated:

"this is not just an isolated

incident of taking money on the basis of one opportunity, because
you are in dire straits, but repeatedly, time and again, taking a
hugh amount of money."

R. 97.

The attorney for the Copy Man

also discussed Patience's actions as if there were one general
plan and intent.

R. 100.

In addition, the plea agreement

evidences a general intent and single plan to alter checks for
her own benefit.

In sentencing Patience, the judge referred to

Patience's crime as a "continuous, ongoing" theft.

R. 107.

Under these circumstances, "the evidence discloses one general
intent" and "one plan, even though there is a series of
transactions."

See Kimbel, 620 P.2d at 518.

Pursuant to Kimbel

and Crosby, the trial judge erred in convicting Patience of three
counts.
As was the case in Crosby, this error was plain and based
on ineffective assistance of counsel.

The error was obvious

pursuant to "clear Utah case law on this issue" (Crosby, 3 02 Utah
Adv. Rep. at 41) issued prior to Patience's sentencing.

See

Crosby, 302 Utah Adv. Rep. at 40-41; Kimbel, 620 P.2d at 517-18.
Additionally, given the "clear Utah case law on this issue" (Id.
at 4 1 ) , defense counsel performed deficiently in failing "to
22

bring the matter promptly to the court's attention and to cite
applicable law."

Id. at 41; see also Id. at 39 (setting out test

for claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).

The error was

harmful in that it resulted in three convictions for Attempted
Forgery instead of one.

Id.

Plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel
occurred in this case where Patience was convicted of three
counts rather than one count of Attempted Forgery.
CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant Jayne Patience respectfully requests
that this Court reverse the Judgment and remand her case for
resentencing.
SUBMITTED this &0H, day of December, 1996.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM B

UTAH CODE
§ 76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode-Included
offenses
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a
defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be
punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be
punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence
under any such provision bars a prosecution under any other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal
episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall not be
subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court, and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant is
arraigned on the first information or indictment.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged
but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An
offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to
commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included
offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the
offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate court
on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a
conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to support a
conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact necessarily found every fact
required for conviction of that included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction
may be set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for the included
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant.
As last amended by Chapter 32, Laws of Utah 1974.

UTAH CODE
§ 76-4-102. Attempt-Classification of offenses
Criminal attempt to commit:
(1) a capital felony is a first degree felony;
(2) a first degree felony is a second degree felony; except that an attempt to
commit child kidnaping, in violation of Section 76-5-301.1 or to commit any of those
felonies described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, which are first degree felonies, is a
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less
than three years and which may be for life;
(3) a second degree felony is a third degree felony;
(4) a third degree felony is a class A misdemeanor;
(5) a class A misdemeanor is a class B misdemeanor;
(6) a class B misdemeanor is a class C misdemeanor;
(7) a class C misdemeanor is punishable by a penalty not exceeding one half the
penalty for a class C misdemeanor.
Amended by Laws 1983, c. 88; Laws 1996, c. 40, s 3, eff. April 29, 1996.

PART 5
FRAUD
76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" defined.
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any
such altered writing; or
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion,
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance
purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or
nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a
numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an
original when no such original existed.
(2) As used in this section "writing" includes printing or any other method of
recording information, checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges,
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or
identification.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the writing is or purports to be:
(a) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued
by a government, or any agency thereof; or
(b) a check with a face amount of $100 or more, an issue of stocks,
bonds, or any other instrument or writing representing an interest in or
claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim against any
person or enterprise.
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third degree if the writing is or purports to be
a check with a face amount of less than $100; all other forgery is a class A
misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-501, enacted by L.
1073, ch. 196, § 76-6-501; 1974, ch. 32, § 19;
1975, ch. 52, § 1.

UTAH CODE
§ 76-6-501. Forgery~"Writing" defined
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any such altered
writing; or
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or
utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, execution,
authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to be the act of
another, whether the person is existent or nonexistent, or purports to have been
executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case,
or to be a copy of an original when no such original existed.
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, electronic storage or
transmission, or any other method of recording valuable information including forms
such as:
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, money, and
any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification;
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued by a
government or any agency; or
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing
representing an interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or
claim against any person or enterprise.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree.
Amended by Laws 1975, c. 52; Laws 1995, c. 291, s 15, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws
1996, c. 205, s 27, eff. April 29, 1996.

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection*]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.
History: Const 1896.
Cross-References. — Eminent domain generally, § 78-34-1 et seq.

ADDENDUM C

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

OCT 2 0 1995
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT B„ C$0*Jb,\

4^am.t

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT

The State of Utah,
Plaintiff,

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL & ORDER
vs.

CRIMINAL NO.
JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN

Defendant.
COMES NOW,

CfrtuNl£

q:.

9prflEh\CB

, the defendant in this case and hereby

acknowledges and certifies the following:
I have entered a plea of (guilty) (no contest) to the following crime(s):
CRIME & STATUTORY PROVISION

DEGREE

PUNISHMENT
(min/max)
and/or
Minimum/Mandatory

3r*

c.
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j Scuo—'
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*

I have received a copy of the (charge) (information) against me, I have read it, and I
understand the nature and elements of the offense(s) for which I am pleading (guilty) (no
contest).
The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as follows: J, ^/-/fi^zo hrd

/fsrfg
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My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable, that
constitutes the elements of the crime(s) charges are as follows:

IT - <5*/v

Q/ ^ Af 5

^

/

I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with knowledge and understanding of the
following facts:
1.

I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot

afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I recognize that a
condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, as determined by the court,
to recoup the cost of counsel if so appointed for me.
2.

if (have nop (feSWTwaived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to

0 0 0 n ? «>

counsel, I have done so knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily for the following reasons:

3.

If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this statement and understand

the nature and elements of the charges, my rights in this and other proceedings and the
consequences of my plea of guilty.
4.

If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ^ ^

and I have had an opportunity to discuss this statement,

my rights and the consequences of my guilty plea with my attorney.
5.

I know that I have a right to a trial by jury.

6.

I know that if I wish to have a trial I have therightto confront and cross-examine

witnesses against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I have
the right to compel my witness(es) by subpoena at State expense to testify in court upqn my
behalf.
7.

I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf but if I choose not to do

so I can not be compelled to testify or give evidence against myself and no adverse inferences
will be drawn against me if I do not testify.
8.

I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me I need only plead "not

guilty" and the matter will be set for trial. At the trial the State of Utah will have the burden
of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury
the verdict must be unanimous.

0 0003 3

9.

I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted by

a jury or by the judge that I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the
Utah Court of Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court and that if I could not afford
to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs would be paid by the State.
10.

I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each offense to which I

pleadrt guilty MmxcontQ3t>. I know that by plnrlingMniiltjjfnp rnntrit) tn an offense that
carries a minimum mandatory sentence that I will be subjecting myself to serving a minimum
mandatory sentence for that offense. I know that the sentences may be consecutive and may be
for a prison term, fine, or both. I know that in addition to a fine an eighty-five percent (85 %)
surcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated 63-63a-4, will be imposed. I also know that I may
be ordered by the court to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes.
11.

I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, or the fine for

additional amounts, if my plea is to more than one charge. I also know that if I am on
probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted or
to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences
being imposed upon me.
12.

I know and understand that by pleading (guiltyjA-ftcteontgat) J am waiving my

statutory and constitutional rights set out in the preceding paragraphs. I also know that by
entering such plea(s) I am admitting and do so admit that I have committed the conduct alleged
and I am guilty of the crime(s) for which my plea(s) is/are entered.
13.

My plea(s) CM (gutity)^jraecsB!e§B (is)-ffi **>t} the result of a plea bargain between

myself and the prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties and provisions of this plea bargain,
if any, are fully contained in the Plea Agreement attached to this affidavit.
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14.

I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my plea(s) <fi (guiltyj (wr

t) I must do so by filing a motion within thirty (30) days after entry of my plea.
15.

I know that any charge or sentencing concession or recommendation of probation

or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by
either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the judge. I also know that
any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the court may do are also not binding
on the court.
16.

No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to induce

me to plead guilty, and no promises except, those contained herein and in the attached plea
agreement, have been made to me.
17.

I have read this statement or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I

understand its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this
statement. I do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are correct.
18.

I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.

19.

I am H y

years of age; I have attended school through the

[ 2 ^ grade and

I can read and understand the English language or an interpreter has been provided to me. I was
not under the influence of any drags, medication or intoxicants which would impair my judgment
when the decision was made to enter the plea(s). I am not presently under the influence of any
drug, medication or intoxicants which impair my judgment.
20.

I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, mentally capable of

understanding the proceedings and the consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease,
defect or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily
entering my plea.

000035

DATED this

f)0^

day of

&£.TZ>E>C&-

, 19^5"

CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for

O'fyf*)?

5

P/hrf^rfCeT

the

defendant above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her
and I have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of
its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the
defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the other representations
and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true.

5RNEY FORDEFENDANT/BARNUMBER
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against
, defendant. I have reviewed this statement of the
defendant and find that the declaration, including the elements of the offense of the charge(s) and
the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense are true
and correct. No improper inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea have been
offered to defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the statement and in the
attached plea agreement or as supplemented on record before the court. There is reasonable
cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s)

for which the plea(s) is/are entered and acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest.

^ 'Co ^ X ^ ? 3
G ATTORNEY/BAR NUMBER

ORDER

Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, the Court witnesses the signatures and finds the defendant's plea of
(guilty) (no contest) is freely and voluntarily made and it is so ordered that the defendant's plea
of (guilty) (no contest) to the charge(s) set forth in the statement be accepted and entered.
DONE IN COURT this

/Q Q

day of f )

y

f*. /*>£**
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PAT B. BRIAN,
DISTRICT COURT J U D G E ^ ^
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E. NEAL GUNNARSON
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
KENNETH R. UPDEGROVE, 4931
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

)

Screened by: K. UPDEGROVE
Assigned to: K. UPDEGROVE

Plaintiff,
BAIL: $25,000.00.
INTORMATIQN^,

-vsJAYNE I. PATIENCE,
DOB 10/27/49
OTN

/?-

j£

Case No.

Defendant.

The undersigned Detective Doug Townsend - SLCOSO, under oath states on information
and belief that the defendant, committed the crimes of:
COUNTI
FORGERY, a S ^ n d Degree Felony, at 3355 South Highland Drive, in Salt Lake County, State
LjJ/ of Utah, on or about February 3, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section
501(l)(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, JAYNE I.
PATIENCE, a party to the offense, did alter a writing of another without his authority or
uttered any such altered writing; to-wit: a check having a face amount of $100.00 or
more.

H (> ft fi f*
O* Vf (I ^

5;

INFORMATION
STATE OF UTAH v. JAYNE I. PATIENCE
DAO No. 95003464
Page 2

COUNT II
FpRGERY, a sjgf^nd Degree Felony, at 1255 East Brickyard Road, in Salt Lake County, State
'M of Utah, on or about February 21, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section
501(l)(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, JAYNE I.
PATIENCE, a party to the offense, did alter a writing of another without his authority or
uttered any such altered writing; to-wit: a check having a face amount of $100.00 or
more.
COUNT III
FORQpRY, a jk(fond Degree Felony, at 1255 East Brickyard Road, in Salt Lake County, State
pf Utah, on or about February 22, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section
501(l)(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, JAYNE I.
PATIENCE, a party to the offense, did alter a writing of another without his authority
uttered any such altered writing, to-wit: a check having a face amount of $100.00 or
more.

TfflS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
Doug Townsend, Ed Wertz, Robert Wertz, Troy Noall, Karen Nelson, L. Mackay, Amy
Earl.

OBABLE CAUSE ST
Your affiant, a Salt Lake County Sheriffs Detective, is informed by agency report 9525246 and personal knowledge and states as follows:
Amy Earl, a teller with First Security Bank, 1255 East Brickyard Road, Salt Lake
County, will testify that on February 3, 1995, and February 21, 1995, defendant Jayne I. Patience
deposited checks drawn on the account of TCM, her employer. Both checks were in excess of

U Vj u v-

INFORMATION
STATE OF UTAH v. JAYNE I. PATIENCE
DAO No. 95003464
Page 3
Troy Noall, a teller with First Security Bank, 3355 South Highland Drive, Salt Lake
County, will testify that on February 22, 1995, defendant deposited another TCM check into her
account which was in excess of $100.00.
Robert Wertz, of TCM, will testify that all three checks had been made payable to other
than defendant and that the checks had been altered to make them payable to defendant
personally or to a business with which she was connected.

DETECTIVE DOUG TOWNSEND
Affiant
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 2J^
day of March, 1995.

<M^
N1A<#STRAT£,:-./ ,.
Authorized for presentment and filing:
E. NEAL GUNNARSON, District Attorney

Deputy District Attorney
March 20, 1995
sbt/95003464
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ADDENDUM D

much as we can for that.

And because of our position, I told

both the defendant and her attorney that we would remain
neutral, and leave that up to the discretion of the Court.

Her

attorney has told us that she would agree that restitution in
the amount of $485,000 plus interest and costs could be imposed
in the criminal action, as well, if the Court deems that
appropriate.

And they have agreed that it would be

nondischargeable in bankruptcy.
That's, basically, what I would like to present to
the Court as our side, from the victim's standpoint.

If the

Court would like to see the settlement agreement and the
judgment

—
THE COURT:

You are invited to file a copy of it with

the Court, and we will include it as a permanent part of the
criminal file.
Anyone else?
MR. DABNEY:
attorney.

My name is Jinx Dabney.

I am an

I have practiced law probably for over 22 years, and

my practice is, has basically been limited to workers
compensation, Social Security cases.
day long.

I like that practice.

I deal with people all

I have made my living doing

that, and I get a lot of enjoyment out of it.
As part of that practice, I tend to trust people. I
trust my clients when they tell me something.
employees when they tell me something.

I trust my

People like Miss

15

Patience, who work for me, had a great deal of trust, from my
standpoint.

I had her doing things that, probably, I might

even question whether I would want my wife to do them.
an awful lot of good legal work for me.

She did

She was a good legal

secretary, extremely bright, very capable, but she had one,
little thing in her, I guess, that went wrong.
I would like to relate one story that I think causes
me to recommend, as I have, incarceration in this case. And
that's this.

She came to me about ten months before I let her

go, which was before I knew what she had done and what she had
stolen from us.
problem.

She came to me and said, "I have a criminal

The judge is going to send me to prison if I don't

come up with some money.

And I need to do it very quickly."

She asked me for the money.

I declined.

She then said, "I

think I can get the money, but I need to have you go over and
talk to Judge Rokich about that, because he is going to put me
in jail.

I haven't got the money in time,"
I suggested to her to borrow the money any way you

can, and I will personally go over and speak to Judge Rokich
about that.

What we did is I went over with her attorney.

met with Judge Rokich in chambers.

We

And I indicated to him that

she was a very valuable employee, that I would trust her with
anything in my office, that she was an excellent legal
secretary, and that, if he were to put her in jail, this would
create a significant impact on my practice, because, frankly,

16

she was one of the —

at that time was the best legal secretary

I had ever had in 20 years of legal practice.
Judge Rokich, to his credit, agreed not to put her in
jail, accepted the amount.

And that was the first case of

embezzlement that came to an end.
I tell that story because, within two or three months
after I went to that extent, Jane started to embezzle from me.
She embezzled $18,000 in a period of about ten months.

I let

her go for reasons not related to that, and discovered it just
by mistake, that it happened.

That probably tells me, for one,

more about the kind of person we are dealing with here than any
other story I could tell you.
different employers.

She has worked for three

She has embezzled from all of us.

And even knowing that, once I had discovered that, I
did not come over here and file a criminal case, or there would
be two cases here before The Copy Man.

And I didn't do it,

your Honor, because she had a young daughter at home, and I
just didn't have it in me to do it.

I look back now, and I say

to myself maybe I should have done that.
gotten the message.
from The Copy Man.
that.

Maybe she would have

Maybe she wouldn't have stolen $485,000
And I feel bad about that.

I can't change

I can simply say, your Honor, these are the facts.
This woman has not learned.

She has manipulated the system.
different employers.

She is extremely bright.

She has embezzled from three

I think society is entitled to have her
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spend some time in prison, because I don't think there is
anything else she is going to understand, but she will
understand that.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Anything further before sentence is imposed?
MR. FLINT:

May I have just one brief rebuttal?

Mr. Dabney has made an impassioned plea, but I would simply
remind the Court his entire dispute with Miss Patience was
resolved as a civil dispute.
judgment against her.

He sued her.

He obtained a

He settled with her for an amount less

than the judgment, and called that a satisfaction, and he
received less than what he was seeking, and less than what he
obtained in the judgment, but he did accept it as payment in
full, and it was a civil matter, and not a criminal matter.
With regard to Miss Patience, I would again simply
implore the Court that what society needs are here, are to make
sure that she doesn't do this again, to protect society from
any type of misuse or abuse of trust by this particular
defendant.

That can be achieved as easily by an intensively

supervised probation, by the wearing of an ankle bracelet, by
reporting in on a daily basis, as well as it could be achieved
by incarceration.
Right now, there is no means whatsoever, if she is
incarcerated for one year or less in the Salt Lake County Jail,
and then placed on probation, there is no means for her to have
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